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Short Introduction for reprint in Capabilities, edited by Alexander Kaufman:  
Distributive justice is concerned with the justice of distribution of benefits and burdens. A very 
basic question concerns the nature of the benefits and burdens that are the ultimate concern of 
distributive justice. This question is independent of the question of how these benefits and 
burdens should be distributed (e.g., equally, so as to maximize the value to the least advantaged, 
or so as to maximize the total). Probably the most natural view is to hold that the relevant 
benefits and burdens are captured by net wellbeing (quality of life; e.g., happiness). This view, 
however, does not allow individuals to be held accountable for their choices (since it is not 
sensitive to how their wellbeing was generated). Several theorists—notably, G.A. Cohen, 
Richard Arneson, and John Roemer—have therefore endorsed something like opportunity for 
wellbeing as the relevant net benefit of justice. Justice, they claim, is concerned with the 
distribution of the opportunity for wellbeing and not with the distribution of wellbeing.    
 Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have defended an apparently alternative view 
according to which the relevant net benefits are capabilities understood as opportunities to 
function in life. This appears to be different than the opportunity for wellbeing approach because 
it emphasizes the value of activity over passive enjoyment. I shall argue, however, that, although 
some versions of the capability view are incompatible with some versions of the opportunity for 
well-being view, the most plausible version of the capability view is identical to a slight 
generalization of the opportunity for well-being view. 
 
Abstract: Amartya Sen and Martha Nussbaum have argued that justice is concerned, at least in 
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part, with the distribution of capabilities (opportunities to function). Richard Arneson, G.A. 
Cohen, and John Roemer have argued that justice is concerned with something like the 
distribution of opportunities for well-being. I argue that, although some versions of the capability 
view are incompatible with some versions of the opportunity for well-being view, the most 
plausible version of the capability view is identical to a slight generalization of the opportunity 
for well-being view. 
 
1. Introduction 
Amartya Sen (1979, 1980, 1982, 1985a, 1985b, 1985c, 1992, 1993, 1997, 1999) and Martha 
Nussbaum (e.g., 1988, 1990, 1999) have argued that justice is concerned, at least in part, with the 
distribution of capabilities (opportunities to function). Richard Arneson (1989, 1990), G.A. 
Cohen (1989, 1990), and John Roemer (1993, 1998) have argued that justice is concerned with 
something like the distribution of opportunities for well-being. I shall argue that, although some 
versions of the capability view are incompatible with some versions of the opportunity for well-
being view, the most plausible version of the capability view is identical to a slight 
generalization of the opportunity for well-being view. 
 This thesis is not novel. The significant similarity of the two views is obvious and has 
been noted by Arneson (1989, pp. 90-93), Cohen (1989, pp. 941-44; 1990, pp. 378-380), and Sen 
(1993, pp 42-46). There are, however, many different versions of the capability view, and many 
of these are radically different from the opportunity for well-being view. I shall identify each of 
the ways that the capability could diverge from a generalization the opportunity for well-being 
view, and argue that none of them is plausible. 
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2. Background 
The issue that concerns us is the “distribution of what?” question in the theory of justice, and not 
the “what form should the distribution take?” question. Much of Sen’s writing has rightly 
focused on criticizing views, such as utilitarianism, that are insensitive (except contingently) to 
issues of distributive fairness. In what follows, I shall assume that justice is sensitive to 
distributive fairness, but I shall not be concerned with how it is so concerned. It might be 
sufficientarian (concerned that people get enough), prioritarian (concerned with giving people as 
much as possible, but with extra concern for benefits to those who have less), or egalitarian 
(concerned giving people equal benefits), some combination of these, or other principles.1 Our 
focus is on the nature of the benefits with which justice is concerned. 
 Below, we shall examine more carefully the nature of capabilities and of opportunities for 
well-being, but it will first be useful to compare them in broad terms with the commodity view, 
which holds that justice is ultimately concerned with the distribution of resources, either for their 
own sake (independently of their value) or for their general value. One version is resourcism, 
according to which justice is concerned with the distribution of the value of resources, where this 
value is determined by its competitive value (based on demand and supply) in society.2 Another 
version is the primary goods approach, which holds that justice is concerned with the 
distribution of primary goods, where these are understood as resources that every rational person 
would want more of.3 The commodity view agrees with the capability approach and the 
opportunity for well-being approach that: (1) Justice is concerned with distribution of certain 
kinds of opportunities rather than outcomes (as opposed, for example, to standard utilitarianism 
and outcome egalitarianism). (2) Justice is, or at least may be, concerned both with the 
distribution of non-personal resources (money, material objects, etc.) and with personal resources 
(abilities, etc.). (Of course, some commodity theorists may reject this claim, but the point is that 
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it does not follow from resourcism or the primary goods approach as such.) (3) Justice requires, 
at least in some cases, that people with inferior personal resources be given superior non-
personal resources. 
 Sen criticizes resourcism and the primary goods approach for failing to recognize that 
resources and primary goods are but means to what ultimately matters for justice, namely the 
opportunity for a good life. Each fails to take into account that individuals vary in their ability to 
convert these means into a good life. Both of these views take the value of a resource—relevant 
for the justness of distributions—to be determined by how people in general value it. They are 
thus relatively insensitive to how particular recipients value it and what they can do with it. The 
opportunity for well-being view is not, at least not obviously, subject to this objection, since it 
holds that resources matter because they provide opportunities to individuals to have a good life. 
The capability view and the opportunity for well-being view are thus similar in this respect. 
 Before considering the details of the capability view, we need to identify and set aside two 
ideas that are sometimes associated with it. First, the capability view is sometimes offered as a 
conception of well-being (good life) rather than as a specification of the goods with which justice is 
concerned. According to this view (roughly), the quality of one’s life depends not only on one’s 
functioning, but also one’s opportunity to function.4 This is not an implausible view, but it is not our 
present topic. We are concerned with the “distribution of what?” question for justice, not the “what 
is well-being?” question. We shall leave open what the most plausible conception of well-being 
(quality of life) is, and focus instead on the currency of justice. Although I shall claim below that 
justice is concerned with something like the opportunity for well-being, this does not commit us to 
any particular conception of well-being. 
 The second point to note is that both Sen and Nussbaum sometimes seem to give a mixed 
answer to the “distribution of what?” question. They both seem to think that there are at least some 
5 
very basic functionings for which justice is concerned that these functionings—as opposed to 
merely with the opportunity for those functionings—be adequate. Sen and Nussbaum, that is, 
sometimes suggest that justice is concerned both with functioning and with the opportunity to 
function (capabilities). Although I would argue against the outcome-based concern, it is beyond the 
scope of this essay to do so. In what follows, I shall limit myself to pure capability views. These 
may not be the views of Sen and Nussbaum.5 
 We are finally ready to begin to examine the capability view in more detail. There are 
three main questions that I shall address: (1) Exactly what kinds of functioning are relevant for 
capabilities? (2) Exactly what kinds of opportunity to function are included in capabilities? (3) 
How is the value of opportunities to function assessed? Adequate answers to each of these 
questions will, I shall argue, leave us with a generalized version of the opportunity for well-being 
view. 
 
3. The Relevant Functionings: The Selection Problem Part 1 
Capabilities are opportunities to function, but what are functionings? Sen makes it clear that 
functionings include not only doings but also states of being.6 Thus, physical and mental 
activities (running, playing piano, etc.), as well as physical and mental states (such as being 
adequately nourished, being in good health, being happy), count as functionings. The question 
that concerns us here is whether all functionings are taken into account or only a subset. An 
adequate view, I shall argue, must take all functionings into account (although, depending on the 
theory of value, not all functionings may be deemed valuable). 
 The first point to note is that functionings need to be understood as including both 
desirable functionings (e.g., states of pleasure) and undesirable functionings (e.g., states of pain). 
Any theory that considered only desirable functionings would be oblivious to possibly very 
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important differences in people’s lives on the negative side. People often write as if all 
functionings are desirable, but this is, I believe, only for the sake of brevity. It seems clear that 
both positive and negative functionings need to be considered. 
 Moreover, all functionings should be considered. None should be excluded from 
consideration. By way of contrast, consider, for example, the view that justice is concerned only 
with the distribution of basic capabilities, on some (non-empty) criterion of basicness. There are 
different criteria of basicness that might be invoked to select the subset of relevant functionings. 
One is the species-normal adult criterion, according to which the relevant functionings are those 
that are exercised by most adults of the species on a regular basis.7 Another is the basic needs 
criterion, according to which the relevant functionings are those necessary for survival and non-
poverty (on some specified criterion). Another is the human flourishing criterion, according to 
which the relevant functionings are those that are necessary for a good human life. There are, of 
course, many other possibilities. 
 Each of these criteria has some problems specific to its content, but I shall not address 
these. Instead, I shall argue that, no matter what the criterion, it is a mistake to hold that there are 
some functionings (the non-basic ones) the opportunities for which are irrelevant to justice. The 
crucial point is that, for any functioning, there are some circumstances in which it would affect 
the quality of one’s life, and justice is concerned with the opportunities for a good life. There are, 
for example, lots of functionings that are not necessary for a good human life, but which can 
radically enhance one’s life. Singing beautifully can very much enhance the quality of one’s life, 
but it is not necessary for having a good human life. Given that any functioning could, under 
some circumstances, enhance (or otherwise affect) the quality of someone’s life, it is a mistake to 
exclude some functionings from consideration. To do so, would leave out something that is 
relevant to justice. 
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The problem generated by excluding some functionings is especially powerful for criteria 
of basicness that exclude lots of functionings. The species-normal adult criterion, the basic needs 
criterion, and even the good human life criterion are highly exclusionary. The former restricts 
basicness to those functioning that most adults of the species exercise on a regular basis. The 
latter two restrict basicness to those that are necessary for a certain kind of life (respectively: 
survival and non-poverty, and a good human life), and there are many functionings that are not 
so necessary but which have a significant impact on whether that kind of life is achieved. Other 
criteria may be less exclusionary, but any exclusion of functionings is problematic. 
 This criticism is based on the assumption that the justice of a distribution of capabilities 
is determined by the distribution of the value of those opportunities to function for individuals. 
Functionings matter, as Sen himself has emphasized, because they are either means to, or 
constitutive of, good lives or other things that agents have reason to value. Hence, it is arbitrary 
to exclude some functionings that can contribute to such value. 
One might think that, if justice is only concerned with getting people above a certain 
threshold (e.g., either non-poverty or minimal flourishing), then certain functionings, and the 
opportunities therefor, don’t matter. That, however, would be a mistake. What matters for justice 
is the value of a person’s capabilities. Even if justice is only concerned with ensuring that the 
value of each person’s capabilities is adequate, no capability that contributes to the value of a 
person’s capabilities should be excluded. Instead, all capabilities should be included, their value 
assessed, and then, if appropriate, improvements beyond the specified threshold can be deemed 
irrelevant to justice. (We shall consider below the question of how the value of capabilities is 
assessed.) 
 This is not to deny, of course, that, for the purposes of public policy, some selection of 
functionings and capabilities will be needed. Public policy will, of course, need to focus on the 
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most important and most easily assessable capabilities. The point here is that the basic principles 
of justice do not exclude any capabilities. 
 
4. The Relevant Opportunities: The Selection Problem Part 2 
Capabilities are opportunities to function, but what is the relevant notion of opportunity? One 
aspect of this question, as Sen (e.g., 1985a) has emphasized, is whether the concern is with 
control freedom only or more broadly with effective freedom. Control freedom to function is 
based on those possible functionings that one can bring about, or at least sufficiently influence 
the probability of coming about, through the appropriate exercise of one’s will. Effective 
freedom to function includes all possible functionings independently of whether one’s will (as 
opposed to nature and the choices of others) plays any role in bringing them about. Consider, for 
example, a person who is temporarily in a coma. Her freedom to be adequately nourished is in no 
way under her control, but if others are disposed to provide intravenous nutrition, she has 
effective freedom (but no control freedom) to be adequately nourished. 
 Sen sometimes writes as if he were concerned only with control freedom,8 but as he 
himself recognizes, this is not a plausible view. Control clearly is important, but it is not the only 
thing that matters for the purposes of justice. Consider two individuals who have the same 
control freedom to function, but for which one has a much greater effective freedom to function 
(e.g., to be adequately nourished). Justice is concerned with this difference. Indeed, suppose that 
they each have no control freedom (because they have lost volitional control), but one has 
effective freedom (because of nature and the choices of others) to have all basic needs met and to 
flourish, while the other has no effective freedom to have even basic needs met. It’s quite 
implausible to think that justice is unconcerned with this difference. To do so, as Sen has 
emphasized, is to fail to recognize the extent to which economic, social and political structures 
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(as well as natural structures) can significantly affect one’s opportunity to function. Hence, 
freedom to function must be construed as effective freedom. (Admittedly, it is misleading to call 
prospects to function that depend on the will of others, and not on one’s will or interests, 
“freedoms”, but I will simply follow Sen here and use “freedom” in this loose way.) 
This conclusion has been challenged by Pettit (2001). He usefully identifies a third kind 
of freedom intermediate between control and effective freedom, and claims that justice is 
concerned with it. Favor-independent freedom includes control freedom, effective freedom 
provided by nature, and effective freedom provided by others when they have an enforceable 
obligation to provide it. It excludes, however, effective freedom provided by others when they 
have no enforceable obligation to provide it (i.e., when they are simply doing it as a favor). 
Justice, we can grant, is concerned with favor-independent freedom to function, but it is 
not solely concerned with this freedom. It is, pace Pettit, also concerned with favor-dependent 
freedom. Consider, for example, the case (modified from an example of Sen 2001) of two 
mobility-disabled persons who are able to get out of their houses only with the help of others. 
Suppose that there is no enforceable obligation to provide such help, but one is able to get out 
because others are highly disposed to provide such help as a favor, and the other is not able to get 
out because others are highly disposed not to provide such help. Neither person has the favor-
independent freedom to get out, since the outcome (getting out) is highly dependent on the favors 
of others. Justice, however, is surely concerned with the difference between the two individuals 
because the effective freedom to get out of one is significantly better than that of the other. (Sen 
2001 makes roughly this reply.) Favor-independent-freedom may be more valuable (even, 
perhaps, in a lexical way) than favor-dependent-freedom, but that is not a reason for restricting 
capabilities to only those freedoms. All effective freedoms can be valuable, and all should be 
included in capabilities. The relative value of different kinds of effective freedoms should be 
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addressed in the evaluation of capabilities, not in their definition. 
 The capabilities with which justice is concerned, then, are effective opportunities to function. 
One’s capabilities at a given time, however, depend in part on one’s past choices, and we now need 
to consider whether justice is concerned only those capabilities that one has as a matter of brute luck 
or also with those that are the result of past option luck. A state of affairs is a matter of brute luck 
for an agent to the extent that the agent could not have (reasonably) deliberately influenced the 
possibility or probability of its occurrence or non-occurrence. A state of affairs is a matter of 
option luck otherwise.9 The effects on one’s capabilities due to one’s initial genetic endowment, 
one’s early childhood environment, and unforeseeable adult events (e.g., being struck by an 
unforeseeable meteor) are a matter of brute luck. The effects on one’s capabilities of one’s past 
choices (e.g., whether to go mountain climbing) are a matter of option luck. 
 Consider two individuals, Diligent and Indolent, who start adult life (as a matter of brute 
luck) with identical capabilities. Suppose that Diligent wisely works very hard at developing her 
capabilities, while Indolent unwisely chooses short-terms pleasures over the significant long-term 
benefits of capability development. Now, after many years, Diligent’s capabilities are significantly 
better than Indolent’s. What does justice have to say about this situation? Does, for example, 
Indolent have a claim to more resources than Diligent because her current (as opposed to initial) 
capabilities are more limited? 
 The central point at issue is whether individuals can in principle be held accountable for 
their past option luck in the sense of having no claim against others to compensation when things 
turn out unfavorably. Brute luck theorists (whether egalitarian, prioritarian, or sufficientarian) 
claim—and I fully agree—that individuals can be so held accountable and that they have no valid 
claims to compensation for bad option luck.10 More specifically, justice is only concerned with 
brute luck capabilities—that is, the capabilities that one has as a matter of brute luck (i.e., ignoring 
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any impact from option luck). 
 The issue is, of course, complex. There are lots of important issues about the exact nature of 
brute luck, and it is controversial that justice is only concerned with the impact of brute luck. 
Furthermore, unlike my earlier claims about functionings and opportunities therefor, the present 
claim is exclusionary rather than inclusionary. My earlier claims were that all functionings (and not 
just basic functionings) and all opportunities (and not just control-freedoms or favor-independent-
freedoms) should be included in the specification of capabilities. Those inclusionary claims are 
much easier to defend, since they do not require that the specified functionings or opportunities 
ultimately be relevant to justice (since the theory of value for capabilities may deem them irrelevant, 
and thus their inclusion may have no effect). The present claim, on the other hand, is exclusionary, 
and hence much more difficult to defend. If the relevant opportunities do not include option luck 
opportunities, then the latter are irrelevant to justice (no theory of value can make them relevant if 
they are not part of the thing being assessed). 
 Although the irrelevance to justice of option luck opportunities to function is not 
uncontroversial, it has been given strong defenses and is widely accepted.11 I shall therefore assume 
that a plausible conception of the capability approach will limit capabilities to brute luck 
opportunities to function. 
 
5. The Evaluation of Opportunities to Function: The Metric Problem 
Capabilities are opportunities to function, but how is the value of a capability set determined? 
There are at least two central issues here: (1) How is the value of functionings assessed? (2) How 
is the value of opportunities to function based on the value of the possible functionings?  
How is the value of functionings assessed? Some of the main possibilities include: 
narrow self-interest (i.e., self-regarding quality of life),12 well-being (i.e., overall quality of life, 
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including, for example, the impact on one’s quality of life of other-regarding concerns), and 
overall agency goals (everything that the agent has reason to value, even if it does not affect the 
quality of her life). Furthermore, well-being can be interpreted subjectively (in terms of the 
agent’s experiences; i.e., in welfare terms) or objectively (e.g., certain forms of perfectionism). 
Sen (e.g., 1985, 1993) tends to favor, for the theory of justice, well-being evaluations, or perhaps 
both well-being and agency goal evaluations. He has also raised powerful objections against 
evaluating well-being as welfare (i.e., subjectively). 
These are, of course, extremely important issues, but for the present purposes we can set 
them aside. The specification of the object of evaluation (capabilities) is independent of the 
specification of how that object is to be evaluated.13 The generic capability approach could be 
combined with any theory of evaluation for capabilities, and for the present purposes there is no 
need to settle the evaluation issue. I shall return to this issue below when I shall suggest that 
whatever theory of evaluation is adopted by the capability approach, this same theory can be 
adopted by a generalization of the opportunity for well-being view. 
One might think that a fundamental difference between the capability approach and the 
opportunity for well-being approach is that the latter, but not the former, is committed to the 
commensurability in value of different functionings (and opportunities to function). One might 
think, for example, that the opportunity for well-being approach, but not the capability approach, 
is committed to the view that the effect on value of any decrease in any functioning can be offset 
by a by sufficiently large increase in any other functioning. Admittedly, opportunity for well-
being approaches are often presented as if well-being and the opportunities therefor were fully 
commensurable in this sense, but there is nothing in the approach that is committed to this claim. 
No amount of money, or other resource or functioning, may be able to fully compensate for 
having multiple sclerosis, but that does not invalidate the opportunity for well-being approach. 
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Suppose, for example, that justice is concerned with equality of opportunity for well-being, and 
that the only relevant features of individuals are the presence or absence of multiple sclerosis and 
the amount of money that they have. Consider a two-person society in which one person has 
multiple sclerosis and the other doesn’t. If no amount of money compensates for having multiple 
sclerosis, then justice will require curing the disease if possible. If that is not possible, then it 
requires giving all the money to the person with the disease. Given that the absence of multiple 
sclerosis is more valuable than any finite amount of money, this will (assuming interpersonal 
comparisons, which are granted by capability theorist) leave the disease-free poor person better 
off then the rich person with the disease. This is not perfect justice, but it is, by assumption, the 
most just feasible alternative, and capability reaches the same judgement. The issue of 
commensurability of functionings and opportunities therefor does not separate the two. 
How, then, is the value of a set of opportunities to function (i.e., capabilities) based on 
the value of the possible functionings? One question here is whether opportunities are only 
instrumentally valuable for the functionings that they make possible. This seems implausible. 
Freedom (especially control freedom) sometimes matters for its own sake and the value of 
opportunity sets should reflect this. Another question is whether (ignoring for the moment the 
intrinsic value of freedom) the value of an opportunity set is based on the expected (i.e., 
probability weighted) value, the minimum (i.e., worst case) value, or some other mathematical 
function of the value of the possible functionings—on the assumption, for example, that the 
agent chooses reasonably in some specified sense. These are very important issues, but 
fortunately we need not decide these issues either. We can allow all possible conceptions of the 
value of opportunities.  
 We are now finally ready to show that a plausible version of the capability approach is a 
version of a slight generalization of the opportunity for well-being approach. 
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6. Capabilities as Opportunities for Well-being 
Capabilities are opportunities to function. Functionings include both doings and states of being, 
and no functionings are irrelevant to justice (justice is not concerned solely with basic 
functionings). Opportunities are to be understood as effective freedoms and not merely as control 
freedoms, but they include only brute luck opportunities and not the effect of past option luck on 
one’s current opportunities. With two qualifications, this gives us a version—indeed a plausible 
version— of the opportunity for well-being view. The latter looks at one’s effective brute luck 
opportunities for a good life, and, given the broad construal of functionings (all doings and states 
of being), this is just the effective brute luck opportunities to function—that is, capabilities. 
One qualification concerns the evaluation of functionings. The opportunity for well-being 
approach evaluates functionings on the basis of the well-being of the agent. Some early versions 
of the opportunity for well-being view (e.g., Arneson 1989) assumed that well-being was welfare 
(i.e., some subjective conception of the quality of life). The opportunity for well-being approach, 
however, is not committed to this subjective method of assessment (and indeed Cohen (1989, 
1990) rejects it). Strictly speaking, however, the opportunity for well-being approach is 
committed to evaluating opportunities on the basis of their contribution to well-being (quality of 
life, whether understood objectively or subjectively). An agent’s well-being is based only on the 
quality of her life, and not on how well the world in general conforms to her desires and values. 
Sen (1985a) draws a useful distinction between well-being freedom—which is the freedom to 
achieve well-being (have a good life)—and agency freedom—which is the freedom to achieve 
that which one has reason to value. One has reason to value one’s well-being, but one also can 
have reason to value many other things (e.g., the well-being of a loved one or the health of the 
environment). 
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If, as Sen tends to endorse, capabilities are assessed on the basis of their well-being 
freedom, then the capability view, so understood, is equivalent to a version of the opportunity for 
well-being view. If, however, capabilities are assessed on the basis of the agency freedom, then 
the two are not equivalent. A small generalization of the opportunity for well-being view, 
however, reintroduces the equivalency. Understand the opportunity for value view to be the same 
as the opportunity for well-being view, except that it does not require that functionings be 
assessed on the basis of well-being. It also allows that they be assessed on the basis of other 
agency goals (i.e., other states of the worlds that the agent has reason to value). With one 
remaining qualification, the capability view is equivalent to the opportunity for value view. 
 The second qualification concerns the evaluations of opportunities. Opportunity for value 
(e.g., well-being) views have tended to assume that opportunities are only instrumentally 
valuable. They have tended to assume that freedom has no value except as conducive to 
achieving valuable functionings. We need not resolve this debate here. We need simply to ensure 
that opportunities may be evaluated in part on the basis of the freedom that they provide over and 
above the instrumental value that such freedom provides for obtaining valuable functionings. To 
make this explicit, we might better call it this the value of opportunity view, which makes clearer 
that opportunities may have intrinsic value.  
 A plausible version of the capability view, we can now see, is equivalent to a version of 
the value of opportunity view. 
 
7. Conclusion 
The capability approach and the opportunity for well-being view are not equivalent in general. 
First, the capability approach might limit functionings to doings (but not states of being), to basic 
functionings (on some criterion of basicness), or to control-freedom (rather than effective 
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freedom) to function. The opportunity for well-being is incompatible with such restrictions, but 
such restrictions, I have suggested are implausible. Second, the capability approach might 
include all opportunities to function, and not only brute luck opportunities to function. Although 
the opportunity for well-being approach could also make this move, it is implausible, and has not 
been made. Finally, the capability approach could adopt a theory of value for functionings that 
includes more than the impact on well-being (quality of life). It could, for example, hold that the 
relevant value is that which the agent has reason to value. Strictly speaking, the opportunity for 
well-being is incompatible with this view, but a slight generalization—the value of opportunities 
view—is not. 
 Although they are not in general equivalent, a plausible version of the capability view is 
equivalent to a version of the value of opportunities view. If this is right, the real work is to 
determine the appropriate theory of value for functionings and the opportunities therefor.14 
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1
 Both Sen and Nussbaum seem to hold that ensuring that everyone’s capabilities are at least 
adequate is an especially important (perhaps lexically primary) concern of justice. 
2
 See, for example, Dworkin (1981). For a defense of resourcism against Sen’s criticisms, see 
Pogge (2003).  
3
 See, for example, Rawls (1971), pp. 90-95 (where he limits his attention to social primary 
goods). 
4
 See, for example, Sen (1993). Sugden (1993, p. 6) notes that although Sen (1992, p. 50; 1993, p. 
38) takes the capability set to include a specification of the actual functioning, it would be clearer to 
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leave this out and simply claim that well-being is function of both the capabilities and the actual 
functioning. 
5
 For a penetrating discussion of Sen, see Cohen (1995), Alkire (2002), and Robeyns (2003). For 
an insightful analysis of the differences between the views of Sen and Nussbaum, see Crocker 
(1995).  
6
 In places Sen writes as if functionings are restricted to doings (e.g., 1980, p. 218; parts of 
1985b, pp. 10-11). Cohen (1990) so interprets him and criticizes him for ignoring states of being. 
Elsewhere (e.g., Sen (1985b, p. 10; Sen 1985a, pp. 197-98)), however, Sen has made clear that 
functionings include states of being. 
7
 Something like this is advocated by Daniels (1990). 
8
 See, for example, Sen (1993, pp. 31 and 38, and the definition of F in 1985b, p. 11). Cohen 
(1990) criticizes him for the exclusive emphasis on what is under one’s control. Sen elsewhere 
clarifies (e.g., 1993, p. 43; 1992, pp. 64-66; 1985a) that he does not intend to limit capabilities to 
control freedom. 
9
 Dworkin (1981, p. 293) introduced the distinction between brute and option luck. For analysis 
thereof, see Vallentyne (2002). 
10
 In Vallentyne (2002), I argue that justice is only concerned with initial brute luck and not with 
(later) outcome brute luck. For simplicity, I here ignore this qualification. 
11
 See, for example, Dworkin (1981), Arneson (1989, 1990), Cohen (1989, 1990), and Roemer 
(1993, 1998). For an important (but mistaken, in my view) recent criticism, see Anderson (1999). 
12
 Sen (1993, p. 37) calls this “standard of living”. 
13
 Cohen (1990) has argued persuasively that metric of value issues (e.g., welfarism vs. 
perfectionism) are independent of the outcome vs. opportunity issue. 
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